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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
AND CO-DEFENDANT 
CONFESSIONS: THE DRIFT 
FROM BRUTON TO 
PARKER V. RANDOLPHt 
Paul Marcus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect of criminal actions against joint defendants is 
the constitutional limitation of the prosecution's ability to introduce a 
confession by one of the accused. When the confessing party fails to 
testify, the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment restricts the 
admissibility of the confession to establish the guilt of other defend-
ants. 1 Few advocates have seriously argued that the Confrontation 
Clause permits the introduction of a non-testifying declarant's state-
ment for the purpose of convicting another defendant identified in the 
confession. As the Second Circuit recently noted, "[O]f course, naming 
him [the joint defendant] would have involved a direct violation of his 
confrontation rights . . . ."2 However, when the jury is specifically in-
structed to consider the confession only as evidence against the confes-
sing party and not against the other defendants/ the issue of 
t © 1979 by Paul Marcus. 
* Associate Prifessor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles. 
I. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
2. United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 917 (2d Cir. 1979). For discussions of the origins 
of the Confrontation Clause, see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir 
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972); Griswold, The Due Process 
Revolution and Confrontation, 119 PA. L. Rev. 711 (1971); Larkin, The Right o.f Confrontation: 
What Next, I Tex. TECH. L. Rev. 67 (1969); Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 
S. CAL. L. Rev. I (1972). 
3. Such a charge is generally referred to as a "limiting instruction;" the jury is told to limit 
its consideration of the confession only to the party confessing. At the close of the prosecution's 
case in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the jury had received the following instruc-
tions: "[The admission] if used, can only be used against the defendant Evans. It is hearsay 
insofar as the defendant George William Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it in 
any respect to the defendant Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay." /d. at 125 
n.2. 
The trial judge had repeated the warning that Evans's confession was to be considered for a 
limited purpose: 
559 
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admissibility is hotly contested. 
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided Bruton v. United States,4 hold-
ing that despite such a limiting instruction, introduction of the confes-
sion violated the joint defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 5 Many 
observers believed that Bruton would seriously inhibit the use of con-
fessions and admissions in a large number of joint defendant trials, es-
pecially in conspiracy trials. In fact, one law professor and practicing 
criminal lawyer characterized the case as the "most meaningful road-
block placed during recent years in the path of the advance of the con-
spiracy-type maneuver toward vicarious proof of guilt."6 
The optimism with which the defense bar greeted Bruton, how-
ever, has proved to be unfounded. Bruton did not deter the use of con-
fessions in joint defendant trials. Instead, prosecutors have been 
encouraged by a steady erosion of the Bruton rule within the last dec-
ade. Courts have broadly applied the principle of harmless error, the 
redaction process 7 and the interlocking confessions exception8 to se-
verely limit the basic Bruton principle. Indeed, as illustrated by the 
most recent opinion in this area, Parker v. Randolph,9 these extraneous 
principles may yet render the Bruton rule impotent. 
Because of the great number of joint defendant cases--chiefly, but 
not exclusively, related to the increasingly . popular conspiracy 
charge 10-a clear explanation of post-Bruton law is extremely impor-
tant. The Supreme Court's most recent foray into this area, however, 
left no majority opinion on point. Consequently, the conclusion that 
the Bruton rule has been replaced by its exceptions is still premature. 
But, I jump ahead. We cannot see what the future holds without 
analyzing Bruton and the developments of the last decade. 
A confession made outside of coun by one defendant may not be considered as evidence 
against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to the confession. 
Therefore, if you find that a confession was in fact voluntarily and intentionally made by the 
defendant Evans, you should consider it as evidence against Evans, but you must not consider 
it, and should disregard it, in considering the evidence in the case against the defendant 
Bruton. 
It is your duty to give separate, personal consideration to the cause of each individual 
defendant. When you do so, you should analyze what the evidence shows with respect to that 
individual, leaving out of consideration entirely any evidence admitted solely against some 
other defendant. Each defendant is entitled to have his case determined from his own acts 
and statements and the other evidence in the case which may be applicable to him. 
/d. 
4. 391 u.s. 123 (1968) .. 
5. See discussion in text accompanying notes 17-48 i'!fra. 
6. Lewis, New Answers to an Old Problem: The Extra Judicial Statement in Conspiracy- Type 
Prosecutions, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 83, 103 (1973). See generally P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION 
AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES§ 5.06 (1978 with 1979 Supp.). 
7. Redaction refers to the deletion of references to co-defendants in the confession. See 
text accompanying notes 83-104 i'!fra. 
8. An interlocking confession is an admission of the defendant which corroborates a co-
defendant's confession. See text accompanying notes 105-09 infra. 
9. -U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). See text accompanying notes 110-50 i'!fra. 
10. See generally Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 
GEO. L.J. 925 (1977). 
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II. THE BASIC PROBLEM 
A. From .Delli Paoli to Bruton 
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The origins of the Bruton rule are easily traced to a dissent by 
Justice Frankfurter in a typical co-defendant confession case, .Delli 
Paoli v. United States. 11 In .Delli Paoli, the Supreme Court held that it 
was not error to admit in evidence a confession of one defendant even 
though that confession made reference to the other defendants. The 
Court determined that an instruction limiting the jury's consideration 
of the statement to the issue of the declarant's guilt preclude~ possible 
prejudice against his co-defendants. 12 Relying on the presumed effec-
tiveness of such instructions, the majority premised its analysis on the 
assumption on that the jury had followed the instructions. 13 Notwith-
standing Justice Frankfurter's vigorous dissent, the majority attempted 
to justify this assumption: 
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the 
law to the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the 
jury finds them. Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will 
follow the court's instructions 14 where those instructions are clear 
and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be 
expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense. Based 
on faith that the jury will endeavor to follow the court's instruc-
tions, our system of jury trial has produced one of the most valua-
ble and practical mechanisms in human experience for dispensing 
substantial justice. 15 
In a powerful dissent Justice Frankfurter questioned the basic 
premise of the majority's decision to allow the use of confessions with 
limiting instructions. In carefully explaining why a jury could not fol-
low the judge's instructions, Justice Frankfurter laid the groundwork 
for a majority opinion eleven years later: 
The dilemma is usually resolved by admitting such evidence 
against the declarant but cautioning the jury against its use in de-
termining the guilt of the others. The fact of the matter is that too 
often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in 
that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be 
wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore be-
comes a futile collaction of words and fails of its purpose as a legal 
protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should 
II. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). 
12. /d. at 239 n.5. 
13. /d. at 241. 
14. The Court would not allow the confession to be used without the limiting instructions. If 
the confession was used against the non-confessing defendants, it would be hearsay. Because it 
was not in furtherance of the conspiracy (corning after the arrest of the defendant) it did not fall 
within the co-conspirator's exception. /d. at 237, relying on Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 
211, 217 (1946): "[C]onfession or admission by one co-conspirator after he has been apprehended 
is not in any sense a furtherance of the criminal enterprise. It is rather a frustration of it." 
15. 352 U.S. at 242. 
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not tell. 16 
Although Justice Frankfurter's op1mon ultimately carried more 
weight than the views of other judges, many pre-Bruton opinions ex-
pressed judicial skepticism of the effectiveness of limiting instructions. 
In a famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson had made the argu-
ment succinctly: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to 
be unmitigated fiction." 17 Perhaps the strongest statement was made 
by Judge Friendly shortly before the Bruton decision: 
Not even appellate judges can be expected to be so naive as 
really to believe that all twelve jurors succeeded in performing 
what Judge L. Hand aptly called "a mental gymnastic which is 
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else." It is impossi-
ble realistically to suppose that when the twelve good men and 
women had [the co-defendant's] confession in the privacy of the 
jury room, not one yielded to the nigh irresistible temptation to fill 
in the blanks [caused by the redaction of the defendants' names] 
with the keys [the other evidence] provided and [to] ask himself 
the intelligent question to what extent Jones' statement supported 
[that evidence], or that if anyone did yield, his colleagues effec-
tively persuaded him to dismiss the answers from his mind. 18 
Judge Friendly's criticism of the limiting instruction is well founded. 
While one may agree to seal one's mind off to certain references or 
descriptions, is it possible to actually do so? The Supreme Court, in 
1968, finally gave a negative answer to this Confrontation Clause ques-
tion. 
B. Bruton v. United States, 19 or How .Do You Unring a Bel/?20 
For all the fanfare which greeted the case, Bruton was very routine 
in some respects. Factually, the case was straightforward. A jury had 
convicted defendants Bruton and Evans on charges of armed postal 
theft. At trial a postal inspector testified that Evans orally confessed to 
the robbery with Bruton. This confession occurred in jail after the de-
fendants' arrests. Obviously, as in .Delli Paoli, this statement was not in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and hence could not fall within any rec-
ognized hearsay exception.21 Therefore, as in .Delli Paoli, the trial 
16. /d. at 247-48. See text accompanying notes 26-29 infra. 
17. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also 
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1947). 
18. United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 1966) (citations omitted). 
19. 391 u.s. 123 (1968). 
20. This phrase in this context is, unfortunately, not the author's but the Missouri Court of 
Appeals'. People v. Rayner, 549 S.W.2d 128, 133 (1977). 
21. Although the hearsay exception is a statutorily created rule of evidence, while the de-
fendant's confrontation rights are constitutionally protected, the two principles are sometimes 
used interchangeably. They are, however, quite different, both in origin and in application, as the 
Supreme Court emphasized in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1969): 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are gener-
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judge instructed the jury to regard the confession onll as evidence 
against the declarant and not against his co-defendant.2 
The Court granted certiorari to reconsider .Delli Paoli. Yet, after 
the grant of certiorari, it became clear that the Court did not have to 
resolve Bruton on the Confrontation Clause ground at all. As it turned 
out, the failure of the police to give Miranda warnings to Evans prior to 
his statement raised serious doubts over the admissibility of the confes-
sion.23 In light of this admissibility problem, the Solicitor General re-
quested that the Court reverse the judgment and remand the case for a 
new triat24 The Court, however, in a very unroutine fashion, was not 
deterred for a moment; without really responding to the Solicitor Gen-
eral's request, Justice Brennan simply noted in his majority opinion 
that "We have concluded, however, that .Delli Paoli should be over-
ruled."25 
The majority opinion is not lengthy. Much of it, particularly the 
early portion, relies on the then recently decided case of Jackson v . 
.Denno26 to demonstrate why .Delli Paoli, for practical purposes, had 
already been overruled. In Jackson, the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected the proposition that a jury could abide by an instruction to disre-
gard a confession as evidence of the declarant's guilt, after finding that 
his statement was involuntaryY Therefore, the Court held that the 
Constitution requires the trial judge to determine whether the declarant 
confessed voluntarily before submitting the statement to the jury for 
their assessment of its credibility.28 Writing for the Bruton majority, 
Justice Brennan asserted that the Court's premise in Jackson was basi-
cally the same as the principle set forth by Justice Frankfurter in his 
Delli Paoli dissent.29 Thus, Justice Brennan believed that the Court's 
ally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is 
complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the 
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our deci-
sions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a 
violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an 
arguably recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evi-
dence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the auto-
matic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied. 
22. See note 3 supra. 
23. The Bruton trial began one. week after Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) had been 
decided. In light of Miranda, the court of appeals had held that the confession was inadmissible 
and on retrial the co-defendant-declarant was actually acquitted. See 391 U.S. at 124 n.l. 
24. /d. at 125-26. 
25. /d. at 126. 
26. 378 u.s. 368 (1964). 
27. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968), citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 
388-89 ( 1964). 
28. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1968). 
29. ''The basic premise of Delli Paoli was that it is 'reasonably possible for the jury to follow' 
sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial statement that his codefend-
ant participated with him in committing the crime." /d. at 126, citing Delli Paoli v. United States, 
352 U.S. 232, 239 ( 1957) (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
Indeed, the Court in Jackson quoted from Justice Frankfurter's Delli Paoli dissent in refer-
ring to the jury's knowledge that the defendant confessed. 378 U.S. at 388 n.l5. This reference is 
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reasoning in Jackson necessarily implied the rejection of Delli Paoli. 
One might argue that Justice Brennan's comparison of the Jackson 
voluntary confession procedure to the Delli Paoli co-defendant confes-
sion issue was inappropriate; that the Jackson decision was inevitable 
because an accused's own confession is much more prejudicial to him 
than a damaging confession by a co-defendant. Because the Jackson 
and Delli Paoli situations may be distinguishable, the Jackson Court 
arguably did not overrule Delli Paoli by implication. This notion, 
though, was handily rebuked by Chief Justice Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in the well-known case of People v. Aranda: 
Although Jackson was directly concerned with obviating any 
risk that a jury might rely on an unconstitutionally obtained con-
fession in determining the defendant's guilt, its logic extends to 
obviating the risks that the jury may rely on any inadmissible 
statements. If it is a denial of due process to rely on a jury's pre-
sumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it may also 
be a denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to 
disregard a codefendant's confession implicating another defend-
ant when it is determining that defendant's guilt or innocence. 
Indeed, the latter task may be an even more difficult one for 
the jury to perform than the former. Under the New York proce-
dure, which Jackson held violated due process, the jury was only 
required to disregard a confession it found to be involuntary. If it 
made such a finding, then the confession was presumably out of 
the case. In joint trials, however, when the admissible confession 
of one defendant inculpates another defendant, the confession is 
never deleted from the case and the jury is expected to perform the 
overwhelming task of considering it in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining 
the guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant. A jury 
cannot "segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes." . . . 
It cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits 
that A has committed criminal acts with B and at the same time 
effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has committed 
those same criminal acts with A. 30 
Apart from its analogy to Jackson, the Court found additional 
grounds to support its conclusion that its reliance on the limiting in-
struction ruling in Delli Paoli was erroneous. The Bruton majority 
wrote that three main reasons had been given to support the holdings 
in cases similar to Delli Paoli. The first, a somewhat dubious one, had 
been offered by Learned Hand. He had suggested that even though the 
especially significant because Justice White was the author of both the Jackson majority opinion 
and the vigorous dissent in Bruton, see text accompanying notes 41-48 supra. Moreover, Justice 
Rehnquist placed heavy reliance on the Bruton dissent in his plurality opinion in Parker v. Ran-
dolph. See text accompanying notes 126-28 infra. 
30. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 359-60, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 ( 1965). 
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jury probably would consider the prejudicial confession if instructions 
were given, admitting the confession was proper because it likely "fur-
thers, rather than impedes, the search for truth .... " 31 Observers of 
the Warren Court in the late 1960's would have expected a frontal at-
tack on such a notion; after all, that argument can be raised to criticize 
many of the evidentiary rulings required by application of the exclu-
sionary rule. Instead, the Bruton majority dealt rather softly with that 
argument. The Court merely stated that the prosecution could have 
introduced evidence other than the confession of Bruton's co-defendant 
and that "[w]here viable alternatives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on 
the pursuit of truth to defend a clearly harmful practice.'m 
A second argument commonly offered in support of limiting in-
structions to allow the admission into evidence of co-defendant confes-
sions is the general policy of preserving the benefits of joint defendant 
trials. The inadmissibility of certain confessions in joint defendant pro-
ceedings could induce prosecutors to bring separate actions, thereby 
sacrificing the benefits of a joint trial to ensure the admissibility of a 
confession against the declarant.33 This argument, however, does not 
justify the Court's holding in .Delli Paoli. Presumably, alternative 
prosecutorial techniques are avoidable in most multi-defendant cases. 
Thus, precluding the admission of co-defendant confessions would not 
necessarily have a significant impact on the number of joint defendant 
trials.34 Moreover, and more to the constitutional point, Justice Bren-
nan noted that the Court's interest in efficient joint proceedings must 
yield to a defendant's confrontation rights. In that respect, he quoted 
from People v. Fisher, a leading opinion of the New York Court of 
Appeals: 
We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to con-
frontation of the witnesses against him and the right to cross-ex-
amine them .... We destroy the age-old rule which in the past 
has been regarded as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence 
by a legalistic formula, required of the judge, that the jury may not 
consider any admissions against any party who did not join in 
them. We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the 
administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of 
constitutional liberty. That price is too high.35 
Without question, the Court articulated the most cogent defense of 
the limiting instruction rule in .Delli Paoli. In that opinion the Justices 
expressed their deeply rooted faith in the jury system: "Unless we pro-
31. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). 
32. 391 U.S. at 134. The major alternative referred to by Justice Brennan has become 
known as redaction. "Some courts have required deletion of references of codefendants where 
practicable." /d. n.IO. After Bruton, the redaction process was pursued with a vengence. See text 
accompanying notes 83-104 infra. 
33. Bruton v. Parker, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968). 
34. See note 32 supra. 
35. 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928), quoted at 391 U.S. at 134-35. 
566 LAW FORUM [Vol. 1979 
ceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where 
those instructions are clear and the circumsta11ces are such that the jury 
can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little 
sense."36 That notion is generally correct; if it were not valid in the 
bulk of criminal cases, the jury system would deteriorate rapidly. Nev-
ertheless, in some cases such unshakable faith in the jury system is un-
warranted and improper. Jackson was such a case, and, as the Court 
observed, Bruton was another: "[T]here are some contexts in which the 
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and 
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical 
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.'m As 
Justice Brennan forcefully argued, the Confrontation Clause requires a 
per se rule excluding co-defendant confessions because the defense has 
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and also because limit-
ing instructions are ineffective.38 
Justice Stewart joined the opinion of the Bruton majority but also 
wrote a concurring opinion. His short concurrence is significant in 
light of the Court's subsequent split on the co-defendant confession is-
sue in Parker v. Randolph.39 First, Justice Stewart stated that even 
though he disagreed with Jackson he felt that precedent required the 
Court to overrule Delli Paoli. Second, he concluded that the Confron-
tation Clause compelled the overruling of Delli Paoli quite apart from 
Jackson, stating: 
I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cau-
tionary instructions when the highly damaging out-of-court state-
ment of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examination, is 
deliberately placed before the jury at a joint trial. A basic premise 
of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is that certain kinds of 
hearsay are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to 
discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the 
36. 352 U.S. at 242. 
37. 391 U.S. at 135. 
38. Justice Brennan argued that the facts of Bruton required the application of a per se rule: 
S~ch a context is present here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of 
a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread 
before the jury in a joint trial: Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant 
but the credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand 
and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation 
to shift blame unto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded 
when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examina-
tion. 
391 U.S. at 135-36. 
This distrust of accomplice testimony continues to be conveyed to juries in the standard crim-
inal instructions. See, e.g., District of Columbia Criminal Jury Instructions (Young Lawyer Sec-
tion, Bar Association of the District of Columbia)§§ 2.22, 2.225 (3d ed. 1978); E. DEVITT & C. 
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 17.06 (3d ed. 1977). 
39. In Parker it was Justice Stewart's vote which made Justice Rehnquist's opinion, rather 
than Justice Brennan's, the plurality opinion. See text accompanying notes 110-50 infra. 
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minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial 
judge might give. It is for this very reason that an out-of-court 
accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissi-
ble against the accused, rather than admissible for the little it may 
be worth. Even if I did not consider Jackson v. Denno controllin~, 
therefore, I would still agree that Delli Paoli must be overruled. 0 
Only Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice 
Harlan joined.41 Although Justice White responded to most of the sub-
stantive points raised by Justice Brennan, the primary focus of his dis-
sent was his conclusion that "juries can reasonably be relied upon to 
disregard the codefendant's references to the defendant."42 As a con-
sequence, he simply saw no Confrontation Clause issue. 
Another major source of disagreement between the majority and 
the dissent was the precedential value of Jackson v. Denno for the case 
at hand. Justice White, the author of Jackson, believed that the co-
defendant confession issue presented in Bruton was distinguishable 
from Jackson for two reasons. In Justice White's view, of primary im-
portance was the exceedingly probative and prejudicial impact of the 
defendant's own confession in Jackson.43 Also, according to Justice 
White, coerced or involuntary confessions are generally inadmissible 
because they are unreliable. Even if the coerced confession were relia-
ble, however, due process considerations would compel a judicial rul-
ing of inadmissibility.44 In defense of the Jackson requirement that the 
defendant's confession be found voluntary before it is presented to the 
jury, Justice White pointed to practical considerations: "[J]uries would 
have great difficulty in understanding that policy, in putting the confes-
sion aside, and in finding the confession involuntary if the consequence 
was that it could not be used in considering a defendant's guilt or inno-
cence."45 
Justice White could easily distinguish the Bruton issue of co-de-
fendant confessions from the Jackson question of voluntariness. The 
confession of the co-defendant is hearsay, it is not reliable, and it is 
treated "with special suspicion."46 Justice White believed that a jury 
can understand these reasons for ignoring the co-defendant's confes-
sion in its determination of the defendant's guilt. As a result, Justice 
White concluded, an instruction to disregard a co-defendant's confes-
sion is effective.47 
40. 391 U.S. at 137-38 (citations omitted). 
41. Justice Marshall did not participate in Bruton. 
42. 391 U.S. 138 n.8 (White, J., dissenting). 
43. Justice White expressed doubts about the effectiveness of limiting instructions in this 
context: "Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justi-
fiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so." I d. at 140. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 141. 
46. Id. 
47. Justice White argued: 
568 LAW FORUM [Vol. 1979 
Considerable doubt may be cast on Justice White's conclusion that 
a jury views a co-defendant's confession as inherently more unreliable 
than a coerced confession.48 For our purposes, though, his two other 
points are even more significant. First, with regard to the damage or 
prejudicial impact of a defendant's own confession, it is undoubtedly 
the most probative and prejudicial item of evidence which can be of-
fered against the defendant. This by itself would explain the holding in 
Jackson. Of potentially equal probative and prejudicial value, though, 
is the confession of a co-defendant who in many cases has known the 
defendant for several years. While a confession is certainly highly pro-
bative on the question of the defendant's guilt, it will also have a 
profound impact on the jury's determination of the culpability of co-
defendants named in the statement. One defendant has admitted his 
criminal activity and has explicitly named the other defendant as a 
criminal, thus severely prejudicing the co-defendant's case. 
Justice White also argued that a jury could more easily disregard 
an unreliable statement than a reliable one. This conclusion is some-
what problematical. Lawyers and judges find a co-defendant's confes-
sion unreliable because it is hearsay and generally inaccurate. Yet, 
consider the following scenario. The prosecutor meticulously estab-
lishes a foundation for the confession, describing in great detail the 
long and close relationship between the defendants. The confession de-
scribes, also in great detail, the participation of the confessing defend-
ant and also the more culpable participation of the non-confessing 
defendant. For the jury to ignore that confession in its determination 
of the guilt of the non-confessing defendants would be at best an ex-
tremely difficult task. Notwithstanding the legal profession's conclu-
sion that the statement is unreliable as it relates to the non-confessing 
defendant, jurors may conclude that it is very reliable, particularly if 
some of the details are corroborated. In short, the ability of the jurors 
to disregard such a statement must certainly be suspect. 
At this point it is helpful to reconsider the central difference of 
opinion in Bruton, as debated by Justices Brennan and White. The two 
Justices had disagreed about the prejudicial impact of co-defendants' 
[T]he codefendants' admissions cannot enter into the determination of the defendant's guilt 
or innocence because they are unreliable. This the jury can be told and can understand. . . . 
Because I have no doubt that serious minded and responsible men are able to shut their 
minds to unreliable information when exercising their judgment, I reject the assumption of 
the majority that giving instructions to a jury to disregard a codefendant's confession is an 
empty gesture. 
/d. at 142-43 (White, J., dissenting). 
48. Justice White's emphasis on the unreliability of the co-defendant's confession is some-
what odd in light of the plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph, which Justice White joined. In 
Parker, see text accompanying notes 110-50 infra, the impact of the co-defendant's statement was 
downplayed in light of its corroboration by the defendant's own statement. But, if a co-defend-
ant's statement is inherently unreliable, it is not clear why the corroboration by the defendant's 
own statement should be so telling particularly when it may not agree on all material points. See 
text accompanying notes 140-50 infra. 
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statements and the ability of juries to limit their use of such statements. 
Justice White lost the argument; the Bruton majority held that a non-
testifying co-defendant's statements were inadmissible because of their 
extremely prejudicial nature and also because a jury might violate the 
sixth amendment by using the confession as evidence against the non-
confessing defendants. As the subsequent discussion of the limited im-
pact of Bruton will reveal, the apparently broad language of the major-
ity has been severely limited by the use of harmless error, redaction, 
and, ultimately, interlocking confessions. 
III. THE RULE WEAKENS 
A. Harmless Error 
Relatively few trial errors are reversible per se.49 A Bruton error is 
not one of them. Indeed, just one year after the case was decided, the 
"Court rejected the notion that erroneous admission at a joint trial of 
evidence such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires re-
versal of an otherwise valid conviction."50 As the Court stated: "In 
some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so ov~rwhelming, 
and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission so insignifi-
cant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
introduction of the admission at the trial was harmless error."51 
The difficulty in this area is not so much that a harmless constitu-
tional error rule exists; the cause for concern is the rather cavalier way 
in which courts apply the rule. Based on Bruton's strong condemnation 
of the use of co-defendant confessions, a reasonable prediction would 
have been that the Supreme Court would apply the rule strictly. Such a 
prediction would have been wrong, as illustrated in the first of the 
·Supreme Court harmless error cases in this area. In Harrington v. Cali-
fornia, 52 the government introduced confessions by three of the four 
defendants at a joint trial. Only one of the confessors took the stand. 
The fourth defendant, Harrington, did not confess but made statements 
that placed him at the scene of the crime.53 The Ninth Circuit later 
summarized the Supreme Court's holding in Harrington: "The Court 
held that the purported Bruton violation was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because of the overwhelming evidence of Harrington's 
guilt and the relatively insignificant impact of the codefendants' 
49. The two most prominent are the coerced confession and the failure to appoint counsel at 
trial. For good and succinct discussions of the per se rule, see J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 315-17 (2d ed. 1975). See a/so Har-
ryman v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 927, 929 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979). 
50. Justice Rehnquist made this observation in his plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph, 
-U.S. -, -, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2138 (1979). Justice Rehnquist was referring to Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
51. Parker v. Randolph,- U.S.-,-, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2138 (1979). 
52. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
53. /d. at 252. 
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largely cumulative statements."54 
On its face, the Supreme Court's analysis of the harmless error 
problem in Harrington was sound. If the other evidence was over-
whelming and if the statements were cumulative, they would not have 
significantly prejudiced Harrington's case. Careful scrutiny of the 
facts, however, coupled with the arguments expressed by Justice Bren-
nan in dissent, reveals substantial flaws in the majority's assertion of 
harmless error. Four defendants were tried in the case. Harrington 
was white, the other three were black. Each of the three confessions 
refers to the fourth person as either "the white boy" or "this white 
guy."55 Although the testimony of two victims placed Harrington at 
the scene of the crime, their earlier testimony that all four of the rob-
bers were black impugned their credibility.56 Moreover, the confession 
of Rhone, the one defendant who did take the stand, was somewhat 
suspect because it was self-serving. Rhone had a gun on his person at 
the time of his arrest but testified that Harrington had given him the 
gun after the robbery. In addition, Rhone stated at trial that Harring-
ton had carried the gun during the theft.57 Thus, the only untainted 
evidence against Harrington consisted of a self-serving confession and 
statements made by victims who had earlier misidentified the perpetra-
tors of the crime. Harrington admitted being at the scene but did not 
concede that he had participated in the attempted theft.58 
In Bruton the Supreme Court had held that the use of co-defend-
ant confessions is so dangerous that the Confrontation Clause pre-
cludes their admission. Yet, despite the absence of other probative 
evidence against Harrington, the same Court held that the Confronta-
tion Clause violations of admitting two co-defendant confessions con-
stituted harmless error. It seems inconceivable that members of the 
Bruton majority could find that these constitutional errors did not, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, contribute to Harrington's conviction. 
The second major Supreme Court decision to address the issue of 
harmless error in the admissibility of co-defendant confessions, 
Schneble v. Florida,59 raises the same troublesome question. Once 
again, at first blush, the majority made a compelling case in support of 
the harmless error conclusion. But, as in Harrington, a closer look at 
the facts must give pause. In Schneble the evidence showed that the 
defendant and his co-defendant were traveling through Florida when 
the victim was murdered. Initially the defendant stated to the police 
54. United States v. Vissars, 596 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1979). 
55. 395 U.S. at 253. 
56. /d. 
57. /d. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
58. /d. at 256. 
59. 405 U.S. 427 (1972). In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) the Court also dealt 
with the harmless error problem in the Bruton context. The discussion there, however, was a short 
one and with the fact situation involved the case has had limited precedential value. 
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that he was not present in the car when the murder took place, but he 
later admitted that he strangled the victim and that his co-defendant 
then shot her. Considerable question was raised as to whether his state-
ments were voluntary.60 The Court, however, limited its grant of certi-
orari to the Bruton issue, assuming the Florida ruling on voluntariness 
was proper. The Bruton issue arose when one of the police officers tes-
tified at trial to a statement made to him by the co-defendant. The co-
defendant's statement implicated the defendant in the murder by plac-
ing him at the scene of the crime. The Court found that the admission 
of the statement of the non-testifying co-defendant was error, but that it 
was harmless. Primarily the Court found the error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because of the petitioner's own minutely detailed 
confession which corroborated most of the major points in the co-de-
fendant's statement.61 
The real difficulty in the case results from the interplay between 
the voluntariness question and the Bruton issue. Because the case was 
tried prior to Jackson v . .Denno62 the question of voluntariness went to 
the jury. The jury received a general voluntariness instruction to deter-
mine whether the confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissi-
ble.63 Thus, according to the Supreme Court majority, the instruction 
ensured that the Bruton error was harmless. That is, the Court con-
cluded that the jury must have found that the defendant's confession 
was voluntary, because the remaining evidence, including the co-de-
fendant's statement, was insufficient to convict Schneble.64 Therefore, 
the Court held that because the jury must have first concluded that 
Schneble's confession was voluntary and then relied on this evidence to 
convict him, any error in admitting the co-defendant's statement could 
not have affected the outcome of the trial.65 
If the Court correctly analyzed the manner in which the jury used 
the evidence, the error was undoubtedly harmless. With the defend-
ant's own devastating statement properly in evidence the co-defend-
ant's less probative remarks could not have influenced the jury. The 
conclusion is correct, !(the jury found that Schneble spoke voluntarily. 
Justice Marshall, in dissent, cast doubt on the validity of that assump-
tion: 
60. The defendant confessed "after he was subjected to a series of bizarre acts by the police 
designed to frighten him into making incriminating statements .... " 405 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, 
J ., dissenting). The bizarre acts included taking the defendant out for a ride in a car and giving 
him the clear "impression that in the car following were some of [the co-defendant's) torpedoes 
who intended to put him out of business. The officers had the officer in the second car shoot off 
firecrackers to make Schneble believe they were being fired upon." Schneble v. State, 201 So. 2d 
881, 884 (Fla. 1967). 
61. 405 U.S. at 431. 
62. 378 U.S. 368. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. 
63. 405 U.S. at 431. 
64. The co-defendant's statement did not assert that the defendant committed the murder, it 
simply placed him at the scene of the crime. /d. 
65. 405 U.S. at 431-32. 
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[W]e cannot say with even a minimal degree of certainty that the 
jury did not find the statements involuntary and that it did not 
choose to disregard them and almost all of the other evidence in 
the case which was derived from those statements. We also cannot 
be certain that the jury did not base its verdict primarily on the 
statement of the codefendant.66 
Alternatively, the jury may have found the statement voluntary but 
nevertheless relied heavily on the co-defendant's statement to corrobo-
rate. Finally, it is also possible that the jury found the statement invol-
untary and then relied heavily on the co-defendant's statement.67 The 
fact is that any of these situations was possible, particularly in view of 
the general instructions given to the jury. No one can say, with any 
degree of certainty, what the jury did or did not do when it retired to 
deliberate. We know what evidence it should have relied on, but not 
what testimony it actually considered. As Justice Marshall pointed out, 
it is "impossible to perceive how the Court can conclude that the viola-
tion of Bruton was harmless error."68 Perhaps Justice Marshall over-
stated the intent of the Schneble majority when he said that the Court 
may have wanted to "emasculate Bruton."69 As an overstatement, 
however, it does not miss the mark by much. The facts in the case raise 
a very real possibility that a jury used a confession in precisely the 
manner outlawed in Bruton. To find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the error did not affect the outcome of the trial clearly indicates the 
very limited importance the Schneble majority attached to Bruton. 
In light of decisions such as Schneble and Harrington, the lower 
courts quite predictably followed the Supreme Court's lead and have 
broadly applied the harmless error rule in Bruton cases during the past 
decade. Although some courts do focus careful attention on the rea-
sonable doubt standard,70 the broad sweep of the Supreme Court deci-
sions has led many courts to find harmless errors in very questionable 
situations. United States v. Vissars71 is a recent illustration of this 
point. Vissars involved a variant of the usual situation because the de-
fendant raised an entrapment defense. The government accused the 
two defendants of participating in a scheme to steal scrap metal from a 
naval shipyard. One defendant, Keenberg, managed a private scrap 
metal company; Vissars, the other defendant, was his truck driver. Vis-
sars's principal defense was that Keenberg was responsible for 
66. /d. at 436 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
67. This would mean that the jury convicted on insufficient evidence. As the majority said: 
"[T]he jurors could on no rational hypothesis have found Schneble guilty without reliance on his 
confession." /d. at 431. See also id. at 436-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
68. /d. at 437. 
69. /d. 
70. For a good discussion of the problem, see United States v. Gonzalez, 555 F.2d 308 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
71. 596 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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whatever wrongdoing occurred.72 This point acquires particular im-
portance in light of the trial problem that developed. At trial, the gov-
ernment had a solid case against both defendants because-
unbeknownst to them-they had dealt with an undercover agent of the 
Naval Investigative Service at the navy yard.73 
The agent testified against both parties and explained how the 
theft took place. The Bruton problem which arose involved a state-
ment made by Vissars to the F.B.I. upon arrest. This statement both 
implicated Keenberg and cast doubt on his story that he had not previ-
ously committed thefts. Vissars did not testify at trial, and the govern-
ment sought to introduce his statement through the testimony of the 
F.B.I. agent who had taken the statement. After a hearing on the Con-
frontation Clause question, the trial judge admitted the statement with 
a stipulation that the prosecution delete all references to Keenberg. All 
references were deleted on direct examination. On cross-examination, 
however, Vissars's lawyer elicited testimony in which the agent re-
peated incriminating statements concerning Keenberg.74 
In its review of the trial court proceedings, the Ninth Circuit as-
sumed arguendo that the agent's testimony violated Bruton.75 Never-
theless, in the following short discussion, the court dismissed the error 
as harmless: 
Our reading of the record indicates that the alleged Bruton 
violation here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Harrington and Schneble. Keenberg testified in his own behalf 
and admitted the two thefts of the scrap metal, leaving as the only 
issue whether he had been entrapped by Baker. Keenberg reiter-
ated all the evidence concerning his participation in the crime he 
now contends violated his rights when elicited from Larson. Both 
Keenberg's attorney and the district judge acknowledged that 
Keenberg had admitted the thefts. Thus, the testimony of agent 
Larson was cumulative and provided the jury with no information 
they would not otherwise have heard. Putting aside Larson's testi-
mony, Keenberg's guilt was abundantly established. Based on our 
reading of the record, we conclude that Larson's testimony had an 
insignificant impact, if any, upon the minds of the jurors. In short, 
any violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.76 
72. Brief for Appellant Keenberg at 16, United States v. Vissars, 569 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Brief]. 
73. The shipyard had been under surveillance due to thefts from the yard. 596 F.2d at 401-
02. 
74. Arguably this line of questioning was beyond the scope of the direct examination, but no 
one objected. /d. at 403. Still it is hard to imagine that the questions from Vissars's lawyer could 
have been restricted when Vissars's defense was to pin the crime on Keenberg. 
75. /d. Why it only assumed the error arguendo is a mystery. After all, the government 
itself seemingly conceded the error at trial when it proposed that references to Keenberg be de-
leted. 
76. /d. at 404 (footnotes omitted). 
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Although this analysis is not terribly objectionable because Keen-
berg did "admit" the thefts, the harmless error conclusion is incorrect. 
As Judge Hufstedler pointed out in dissent the "case against Keenberg 
was strong, but I do not believe that it was overwhelming."77 More 
important, this was not a standard Bruton case.78 Here the defense 
raised an entrapment claim, a realistic argument in light of the broad 
testimony of the undercover agent.79 Once the trial court admitted this 
damaging statement, Keenberg was forced to take the stand because 
the statement sharply challenged his credibility and raised the real pos-
sibility that he did have a preexisting intent to commit the crime.80 
Moreover, the harmless error argument becomes more problemati-
cal when placed in the particular context of Vissars. Not only was the 
entrapment issue a serious problem, but here the co-defendant, Vissars, 
was attempting to shift the blame onto his apparent boss. Co-defend-
ant's counsel managed to place before the jury Vissars's statements to 
the F.B.I. incriminating Keenberg. In this situation, it seems disingen-
uous to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence did not 
contribute to the jury verdict. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit relied 
on the broad language of Harrington and Schneble to reach precisely 
that conclusion. But if Bruton is to be taken seriously, the facts of Vis-
sars suggest a strong possibility of prejudicial error. One defendant 
was confronted with a powerful and incriminating statement by his co-
defendant. This confrontation, introduced with no opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant, violates the sixth amendment and may 
77. /d. (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
78. Judge Hufstedler argued: 
I cannot conscientiously apply the constitutional error standard as the majority does. In 
reaching this conclusion I am influenced not only by the weight of the evidence as a whole, 
but also by the impact on the whole course of the trial of the improper admission of the 
testimony in violation of the Bruton rule. After the testimony was admitted, Keenberg had 
no practicable course open to him other than taking the stand and attempting to establish 
entrapment. Accordingly, I would reverse Keenberg's conviction for Bruton error. 
79. See Brief, supra note 72, at 7-9. 
80. The court noted: 
In his brief before this court, Keenberg refers to the following statements and the inferences 
he claims the jury could draw: 
That [Vissars] had been at Mare Island on more than the two occasions around which this 
case revolves . . . from which the jury might infer his employer's involvement in other, 
uncharged illegal acts particularly in light of the testimony from the chief government wit-
ness about the history of corruption at that facility; 
That he "had come up with . . . Marc Keenberg"; 
That Keenberg had told him of the sand in the truck "about one week ago" ... -the exact 
date and place of this never being specified . . . ; 
That Keen berg directed Vissars where and when to dump the sand . . . , obscuring the fact 
that Baker had just instructed Keenberg about this; 
That "an unidentified individual" who worked at Mare Island was let out of the truck 
before the dumping occurred on both occasions ... ; 
That Vissars surmised the purpose of the sand was to increase tare weight to conceal scrap 
. . . but "he had not questioned Keen berg about this as his attitude was if the boss told him 
to do something, he would do it" ... ; 
That "he realized what was going on was probably illegal". . . . 
596 F.2d at 403. 
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have seriously prejudiced the defendant's case. Yet Vissars is hardly 
unique for its treatment of the harmless error argument. All too often 
harmless error has become the most attractive course of conduct for 
federal courts in the wake of the Supreme Court's own post-Bruton 
retreat. 81 
This discussion of the Supreme Court cases and lower court cases 
finding harmless error in Bruton violations is not intended to suggest 
that defendants in these cases unquestionably suffered prejudicial er-
ror. Yet, if Bruton is as important as the majority there thought· and 
said, and if the standard for harmless error requires a determination by 
the court that the error did not affect the outcome beyond a reasonable 
doubt, one must seriously question both the current scope and viability 
of Bruton. A review of the harmless error cases in this area indicates 
that Bruton has been seriously diluted.82 
B. Redaction 
Justice Brennan's Bruton opinion suggested that the courts could 
avoid Confrontation Clause difficulties and maintain effective prosecu-
tion in joint defendant trials by requiring "deletion of references to co-
defendants where practicable."83 With this process of deletion, gener-
ally known as redaction, the prosecution can use the confession against 
the declarant without implicating the other defendants, thereby reduc-
ing the risk of prejudice to their cases. Although even an effective re-
daction process might not eliminate all the problems,84 Justice White in 
Bruton offered his view of the required components of a successful re-
daction. Because Justice White was dissenting, these standards appar-
ently define the minimum the prosecution would have to satisfy: 
Effective deletion will probably require not only omission of all 
direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any 
statement that could be employed against those defendants once 
their identity is otherwise established. Of course, the deletion must 
not be such that it will distort the statements to the substantial 
prejudice of either the declarant or the Govemment.85 
Justice White's language is important because the Bruton majority 
did not discuss the redaction process; nor has the Court discussed it in 
81. The Ninth Circuit experience is typical. See, e.g., United States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, 
1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972); Nelson v. United States, 425 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.), 
cerl. denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970); Clark v. United States, 412 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 396 
u.s. 919 (1969). 
82. This problem became even more aggravated when the Coun ultimately considered 
Parker v. Randolph,- U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979), in which the panies raised serious harmless 
error questions. The Coun, however, went beyond these questions and found no error at all. See 
text accompanying notes I 10-50 i'!fra. 
83. 391 U.S. at 134 n. 10. 
84. Justice White in Bruton was one who raised the question: "I would hope, but am not 
sure that by using these [redaction] procedures the Federal Couns would escape reversal under 
today's ruling." Id. at 144 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting). 
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the past ten years. Justice White's view of a successful deletion or re-
daction was undoubtedly correct; a redaction should only be viable if 
the confession makes no direct or indirect reference to the co-defend-
ants. Otherwise, the process would simply require the jurors to inter-
pret the indirect references; once they completed the puzzle, the 
confession would be as prejudicial as it was before redaction. If the 
courts had uniformly adhered to this definition of the redaction proc-
ess, the use of confessions at joint trials would not have created serious 
problems. Unfortunately, many courts do not heed Justice White's ad-
vice, suggesting the routine nature of widespread violations of both the 
spirit and letter of Bruton. 86 
A prosecutor intent on offering a co-defendant's statement gener-
ally does not use a crude or thinly disguised device to identify the de-
fendant whose name has been excised. In some cases, it is true, the 
prosecution simply uses a "blank" instead of a name,87 allowing the 
jury very quickly to "fill in the blank." Normally, though, the tech-
nique is somewhat more subtle, as in the standard case where refer-
ences to the defendant are deleted but other evidence identifies the 
missing name quite clearly. 
United States v. IJady88 is a well-known example of the subtle re-
daction technique. In that case, three defendants were convicted of 
conspiracy to rob a bank. Properly admitted evidence89 showed that 
the declarant and his two co-defendants had met several times to dis-
cuss the possibility of robbing the bank in question. An F.B.I. agent 
who testified at trial related the declarant's confession to the jury. The 
judge required the deletion of any reference to defendants other than 
the declarant. Notwithstanding the deleted references, the co-defend-
ants appealed their conviction claiming a Confrontation Clause viola-
tion. 
The appellants contended that the redaction was ineffective be-
cause other evidence established that they had accompanied the declar-
ant to the bank. In addition, they argued that because the declarant 
admitted going to the· bank with intent to commit robbery, the jury had 
to infer that the other defendants accompanying him had the same in-
86. Many courts do impose careful limitations on the process to ensure that the non-confess-
ing defendants are not identified. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 474 Pa. 409,414,378 A.2d 
859, 861 (1977) ("Where, however, as in this case the confession does not contain a trace or a hint 
of participation in the crime by appellant redaction is permissible."); United States v. Danzey, 594 
F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The use of the word 'Blank' made it 'certain that the jury knew that 
the names were being redacted of the individuals in question.'"); Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643, 
647 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cleveland, 590 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1978). Unfortunately, as 
can be seen below, such cases are all too often the exception to the rule rather than the law widely 
followed. 
87. See, e.g., United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1979). 
88. 536 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1976). 
89. This evidence consisted of testimony of two early participants in the conspiracy. /d. at 
676. 
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tent.90 The appellate court quickly disposed of this dispute. For the 
Ninth Circuit, the issue was whether the jury could have convicted the 
co-defendants based on other evidence introduced by the prosecution. 
The court emphasized the probative value of this other evidence and 
did not focus on whether the jury in fact used the confession against the 
co-defendants: 
If an inference arose that [the co-defendants] intended to rob the 
bank, it arose from the fact that independent evidence showed that 
they had accompanied Harrison to the bank, had discussed rob-
. bing the bank, and had discussed obtaining guns for that purpose. 
None of this evidence came from the confession, but came directly 
from the (other] testimony .... 91 
The court's concise analysis avoided the main thrust and purpose 
of Bruton. Justice Brennan, the author of Bruton, was disturbed by the 
prejudicial value of confessions introduced against co-defendants who 
do not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The con-
fession admitted at trial in IJady had deleted all specific references to 
the co-defendants; nevertheless, the confession was offered in the con-
text of other testimony placing the defendants with the confessing party 
at the time of the crime. Thus, the jury inevitably concluded that when 
the confessing party admitted to having the intent to commit robbery, 
he meant that all defendants had the same intent. In essence, the jurors 
used the declarant's confession against the defendants after they inter-
preted it by looking to lawfully admitted evidence. If the use of a con-
fession against a defendant violates the Confrontation Clause when the 
declarant cannot be cross-examined, it is difficult to understand why 
the procedure in IJady was not contrary to the sixth amendment; the 
declarant's confession was used to incriminate the defendants. Never-
theless, the court did not pause in rejecting the constitutional argument. 
Consistent with the IJady court's conclusion was the Third Cir-
cuit's recent opinion in United States v. Belle.92 The court faced a situ-
ation in which properly admitted evidence established that defendant 
Belle had met with two of the other defendants. One of the co-defend-
ants confessed and stated that he was present at the site of the alleged 
meeting. This statement, however, did not refer to Belle. Nevertheless, 
other evidence linked Belle to the same location at the same time. Belle 
contended that the introduction of the confession violated Bruton: 
In essence, Belle is asserting that whenever a codefendant incrimi-
nates himself in a statement which by its expressed terms does not 
mention or refer to a joint defendant the Bruton rule will preclude 
its admission into evidence in a joint trial if there is any other evi-
dence which links the complaining defendant to the substance of 
90. /d. at 677. 
91. /d. at 678. 
92. 593 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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the statement.93 
The Third Circuit summarily rejected this argument. Pointing out that 
a confession is admissible when the prosecution redacts the names of 
joint defendants, the court reasoned that a confession which made no 
reference to other parties is also admissible.94 Admitting the possibility 
that the confession had inculpated Belle, the court stated that it could 
have done so "only insofar as other evidence may connect Belle to [the 
declarant]."95 Belle was not prejudiced the court concluded, because 
he was incriminated "only to the extent that the jury made inferences 
based on other clearly admissible evidence which may tend to connect 
Belle to [the declarants]."96 
Again, it seems that the court lost sight of the purpose of Bruton to 
prohibit the use of confessions which prejudice non-confessing defend-
ants. In fairness to the Belle majority, the court faced an extended ap-
plication of Bruton because the confession absolutely did not implicate 
the co-defendants except when considered in conjunction with lawfully 
admitted evidence. That problem, however, was of little concern to the 
court. Instead, the majority focused its attention on the government's 
need to prosecute joint trials: 
To require what Belle seeks here would lead to the necessity for 
the Government to expose its entire case on a motion for sever-
ance. Indeed, whether or not a motion for severance is ever made, 
such a result would require the trial judge to examine under a mi- · 
croscope all the prosecution's evidence in order to determine 
whether any extra-judicial statement made by a nontestifying co-
defendant could be admitted as to that defendant, or whether it 
would have to be excluded because of the existence of independent 
"linkage" evidence which might connect another defendant to the 
statement. This result would necessarily lead to either a complete 
"mini-trial" before the judge, or to the practical prohibition of 
joint trials.97 
The dissenting judge in Belle was not persuaded by the supposed 
impact of Belle's argument on joint trials. He focused attention on 
Pointer v. Texas,98 where the Supreme Court had first applied the Con-
frontation Clause to the states.99 Justice Black, writing for a unani-
93. /d. at 493. 
94. /d. at 493-94. That may well be true for some confessions, where the confessions them-
selves have little to do with the other defendants. It cannot be true, however, where the entire 
basis of liability is association with other defendants who just happen to have their names deleted 
from the confession. The harm, in the latter case, is severe and directly related to the use of a 
confession, a practice which Bruton prohibited. 
95. The court continued: "In such a case, we do not believe that the statement qua statement 
can be said to be 'powerfully incriminating' as to Belle and thus inadmissible under Bruton." /d. 
at 494. 
96. /d. at 495. 
97. /d. at 496. 
98. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
99. Bruton was first applied to the states in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1969). 
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mous Court, had there emphasized that the Confrontation Clause was 
vital to our system of criminal justice, protecting "fundamental" values, 
essential to due process and separate from the more instrumental con-
cern for truth gathering. 100 This, the dissent in Belle wrote, was the 
essential linchpin of Bruton. Because the defendant's statements could 
prove extremely damaging to the co-defendant, and because the de-
fendant had no opportunity to confront the declarant, introduction of 
the statement into evidence violates sixth amendment values. Applying 
this analysis, the Belle dissent noted that the defendant was in fact 
damaged by the declarant's statement; because the co-defendant could 
not cross-examine him, Bruton was violated. Unhappily, the majority 
in Belle never responded to this argument. Indeed, to cite the words of 
the dissent, "[O]ther than its arid exegesis of Bruton the majority has 
adduced no policy, principle, or purpose served by its narrow construc-
tion of Justice Brennan's language." 101 
Virtually any reading of Bruton supports the conclusion that the 
defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated in Belle. Even Jus-
tice White's dissent in Bruton had recognized limitations on admitting 
redacted confessions. And as the dissent in Belle persuasively ar-
gued, 102 so-called "linkage testimony" 103 makes otherwise valid confes-
sions unconstitutional in cases like Belle, even under Justice White's 
view of Bruton. 
The most disheartening recent development in this area, however, 
has been the tendency of courts, such as the Third Circuit in Belle, to 
focus on the practical impact of constructions of Bruton. An increasing 
number of courts have begun to emphasize the potential harm to prose-
cutors from limiting the effect of redaction, while minimizing the dan-
gers of infringing on joint defendants' constitutional rights. This threat 
to the prosecution, though, may be more apparent than real. It is not at 
all clear that a limited use of redactions would in fact eliminate joint 
trials or substantially decrease them. Even more important, if the two 
values at issue are maintenance of joint trials and violation of Confron-
tation Clause principles, surely the fundamental considerations of the 
sixth amendment must prevail. The dissent in Belle made this point 
well: 
In an effort to defend its narrow construction of the Confron-
tation Clause on policy grounds, the majority argues that a 
broader rule covering linkage testimony would require the govern-
ment "to expose its entire case on a motion for severance." 
100. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
101. 593 F.2d at 505 n.9 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent was vigorous in its criticism of 
the majority's position: "(T]he majority reads Bruton as if it were construing the terms of a care-
fully drafted contract. At no point does it offer a theory of that case or refer, even casually, to the 
general purposes of the Confrontation Clause." /d. at 501. 
102. United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 505 n.IO (3d Cir. 1979). 
103. /d. at 505. 
580 LAW FORUM [Vol. 1979 
This, the majority asserts, would result in "the practical prohi-
bition of joint trials." I do not believe that applying Bruton to 
circumstantial evidence, as well as to direct accusations, entails 
such draconian consequences. At most, a broader rule would re-
quire trial courts to survey the codefendant statements which the 
goverment plans to introduce and order the production of those 
statements which are arguably substantial enough to supply mean-
ingful linkage evidence. Trial judges are thoroughly familiar with 
such tasks, experienced as they are in the intricacies of complex 
discovery proceedings in modern litigation. I do not expect them 
to have any less facility with the responsibility that Bruton requires 
them to discharge. More critically, even if a less crabbed reading 
of Bruton does require fewer joint trials, this, at most, will produce 
some loss in the efficiency of the adjudicatory process. That small 
cost, however, will vindicate confrontation rights which Justice 
Black in Pointer termed "fundamental." The majority has sacri-
ficed those fundamental rights on the altar of efficiency. The Con-
stitution warrants better treatment. 104 
C Interlocking Co'!(essions 
The most intense battle for the extension, maintenance, or restric-
tion of Bruton has arisen over the use of interlocking confessions. This 
confession problem arises when the defendant makes a statement 
which in some way implicates himself in the crime. The government 
then introduces the confession of a co-defendant which names the de-
fendant and, at least in certain aspects, overlaps with or corroborates 
the defendant's own statement. The two statements are said to inter-
lock. Defendants have strenuously objected to the admission of the co-
defendant's statements in this situation, asserting that it violates Bruton 
because the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination, and that 
even with limiting instructions the confession will be used against the 
defendant. 105 The government, of course, typically counters this objec-
tion with the argument that the prejudice is created by defendant's own 
statement and that the co-defendant's statement is merely cumulative. 
The lower federal courts split on the issu.e. 106 Some held that Bruton 
applied in this context to make the co-defendant's statement inadmissi-
ble. 107 Others found Bruton inapplicable to interlocking confessions. 108 
104. ld. at 511 n.25 (citations omitted). 
105. There is no question that the co-defendant's statement is being used against the defend-
ant, if he is in fact named in it. A properly redacted statement would avoid·this problem. See text 
accompanying notes 83-104 supra. 
106. The Court collected the cases in Parker v. Randolph,- U.S.-, n.4, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2137 
n.4 (1979). 
107. Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d 
Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). See also Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 
1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970). 
108. Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. lOll (1972). 
No.3] JOINT DEFENDANT CONFESSIONS 581 
Still others avoided the central Bruton question and instead decided 
that the harmless error rule governed. 109 
Quite apart from whether Bruton applies to interlocking confes-
sions, many other questions have been raised in connection with these 
cases: what is an interlocking confession; how much of the defendant's 
own statement must be consistent with the co-defendant's statement; 
how significant is it if portions of the two statements are contradictory; 
would Bruton never apply if the defendant made a statement which 
was corroborated by the co-defendant. It was to answer these ques-
tions, as well as to settle the conflict between circuits over the basic 
question, that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parker v. Ran-
dolph. 
IV. PARKER V. RANDOLPH 
To quote the Sixth Circuit opinion, the facts of Parker involved "a 
sequence of events which have the flavor of the old West before the law 
ever crossed the Pecos. The difference is that here there are no heroes 
and here there was a trial." 110 The saga unfolded when a gambler went 
to Memphis, Tennessee and began cheating Robert Wood at cards. 
Wood and his brother arranged to have the card game robbed by three 
persons, but before the robbery could take place the gambler was shot. 
The victim was dead when the three defendants entered the apartment. 
As to the culpability of the two brothers, the evidence was quite sub-
stantial; the problem in proof related to the three late arriving defend-
ants, none of whom took the stand. The eyewitness could not identify 
any of them. The only significant testimony from an actual participant 
was that one of these three defendants other than Randolph had en-
tered the room after the killing. This witness was unable to identify 
either of Randolph's companions. 111 
The major evidence offered at trial against the three defendants 
was the confession of each, which had been given voluntarily to the 
Memphis police. Although the prosecution had eliminated the other 
defendants' names from each confession, a jury with access to all of the 
statements would not doubt which names had been deleted. 112 The 
three defendants were convicted under Tennessee's felony-murder law 
and received life sentences. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, 
finding no Bruton violation because the trial court had instructed the 
109. Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (lOth Cir. 1971); United States v. Walton, 538 F.2d 
1348 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). For discussion of the state cases in this area, see 
the Court's reference to the cases in Parker,- U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2137 n.4 (1979). 
110. Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1179 (6th Cir. 1978), reversed,- U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 
2132 (1979). According to Justice Rehnquist: "The cast of characters playing out the scenes that 
led up to the final shooting could have come from the pen ofBret Harte." Parker v. Randolph,-
U.S.-, -, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2135 (1979). 
Ill. 575 F.2d at 1180 n.2. 
112. Id. at 1180. 
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jury that each confession could be used only against its declarant and 
because the confessions were "similar in material aspects." 113 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's grant of writs of 
habeas corpus, and ruled that Bruton had been violated. While ex-
pressly recognizing that its holding on the interlocking confessions the-
ory was in conflict with that of other federal courts, 114 the court found 
prejudicial error. 115 
In this posture, the case put the interlocking confessions issue 
squarely before the Supreme Court. Thus, interested members of the 
bar hoped that the Court would finally resolve this issue which had 
become increasingly burdensome for the lower courts. Unfortunately, 
with only eight Justices voting, 116 the Court did not hand down a ma-
jority position on the Bruton issue. Three members of the Court (the 
Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart and White) joined the portion of the 
opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist (Part II) that discussed the applica-
tion of Bruton. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion in which he 
stated that he did not join in that part of the plurality's discussion. Jus-
tice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. 
The short plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist is a disappoint-
ment. It is not a disappointment in the manner in which it states the 
law, for it does adopt a very clear position. In fact, Justice Blackmun 
characterized the Parker plurality opinion as "a per se rule to the effect 
that Bruton is inapplicable in an interlocking confession situation." 117 
Nor is the decision a disappointment for its failure to state a majority 
position on interlocking confessions; 118 the plurality cannot be faulted 
for the Court's lack of accord. Rather, it is a great disappointment in 
•its narrow view of Bruton and in its reliance on tired and outdated 
notions of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and of the ability 
of jurors to follow instructions. 
Much of the briefs, and the oral argument as well, 119 was directed 
to the harmless error question. Justice Rehnquist made clear, however, 
that this was not to be the central issue for he preferred to "cast the 
issue in a slightly broader form than that posed by petitioner." 120 In 
the view of the plurality the dispositive fact was that the defendant had 
voluntarily confessed. With this confession the co-defendant's state-
ment became far less material, for the defendant's confession is "proba-
bly the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
113. - U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2136. 
114. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra. 
115. For a discussion of the harmless error issue involved in the case, see text accompanying 
note 134 i'!fra. 
116. Justice Powell did not participate. 
117. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2141 (Biackmun, J., concurring in part). 
118. Justice Stevens makes this point bluntly by referring to the position of the plurality "if 
ever adopted by the Court .... " /d. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2144 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
119. 25 CRtM. L. RPTR. 4005 (1979). 
120. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2139. 
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against him." 121 In what sounds suspiciously like a harmless error ar-
gument, the plurality stated that with the defendant's own confession in 
evidence, "impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross examina-
tion would likely yield small advantage to the defendant. ... " 122 
This conclusion by the plurality is both naive and wrong. In many 
cases such impeachment will be valuable when certain aspects of the 
two confessions are not wholly consistent. 123 Moreover, however small 
the advantage may appear to the Court, 124 the result here is identical to 
the situation condemned in Bruton: the co-defendant's confession was 
being introduced into evidence against a defendant who had no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant. 
Apparently recognizing the difficulty of defending this argument, 
Justice Rehnquist shifted ground and focused his attention on whether 
the co-defendant's statement had been used against the defendant. If 
the jury did not use the statement, Justice Rehnquist explained, the 
defendant could hardly claim constitutional error. This argument, too, 
is a difficult one to make, for the defendant was named in the co-de-
fendant's statement. 125 Thus, the only way out of the dilemma is to say 
that the jury followed the trial judge's limiting instructions to consider 
the co-defendant's confession only against the co-defendant and not 
against the defendant. In fact, the plurality recognized that their opin-
ion was predicated on this assumption: 
A crucial assumption underlying that system [trial by jury] is that 
juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. 
Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a 
jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a 
criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. 126 
If this language sounds strongly reminiscent of an earlier part of 
this article, the reader should review the remarkably similar language 
cited earlier from the Delli Paoli majority opinion 127 and from Justice 
White's dissenting opinion in BrutonY8 The problem with the use of 
such language, of course, is that the Bruton Court rejected precisely the 
argument made in those two opinions and concluded that in cases in-
volving co-defendant's confessions, juries either would not or could not 
follow the judge's instruction to limit their consideration. Justice 
121. Id., quoting with approval Justice White's dissent in Bruton, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
122. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2139. 
123. This point is developed strongly by Justice Stevens. Id. at--, 99 S. Ct. at 2143-48. 
See text accompanying notes 131-39 infra. 
124. Reasonable people can differ on whether this advantage is great or not, but such an 
analysis is truly a harmless error consideration. It does not help when the question is, as a primary 
matter, whether the Confrontation Clause was violated. 
125. The redaction used at trial had been unsuccessful. See text accompanying note 112 
supra. 
126. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2139. 
127. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra. 
128. See textaccompanying notes 43-48 supra. 
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Rehnquist attempted to avoid this difficulty by limiting the applicabil-
ity of Bruton while conceding that the case is still good law. The case 
may be good law, but the Parker plurality took a significant step to-
wards restricting Bruton to its own facts by concluding that: "[W]hen 
the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe 
the constitutional scales tip the other way." 129 The argument again ap-
pears to be a harmless error contention; the right to a fair trial has not 
been seriously impeded because the confession of the defendant was in 
evidence. Justice Rehnquist, however, went on: 
The "rule"-indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury 
trials functions under the American judicial system-is that juries 
can be trusted to follow the trial court's instructions. Bruton was 
an exception to this rule, created because of the "devastating" con-
sequences that failure of the jury to disregard a codefendant's in-
culpatory confession could have to a nonconfessing defendant's 
case. We think it entirely reasonable to apply the general rule, and 
not the Bruton exception, when the defendant's case has already 
been devastated by his own extra-judicial confession of guilt. 130 
The plurality opinion creates a paradox. It may not be very preju-
dicial to have the co-defendant's statement in evidence when the de-
fendant's own statement is before the jury. The Bruton majority, 
however, asserted that jurors typically will not disregard a prejudicial 
co-defendant confession; it is difficult to understand how they will dis-
regard it when the defendant's own statement is also before them. Ei-
ther limiting instructions work or they do not work. Nor is Justice 
Rehnquist's reference to the "devastating" impact of the evidence in 
Bruton relevant to the Confrontation Clause issue; rather, that fact re-
lated to the harmless error inquiry in that case. The Bruton error may 
not have affected the Parker trial; nevertheless an error did occur, be-
cause the prosecution used the statement of the co-defendant against 
the defendant who had no opportunity for cross-examination. This 
statement bears repeating for the plurality repeatedly misapplied the 
harmless error analysis to sixth amendment questions. Nevertheless, 
the plurality stood by its analysis, concluding "that admission of inter-
locking confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the 
requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution." 131 
The plurality opinion is wrong, but it is not yet the law. Neither 
Justice Blackmun in his concurrence nor the three dissenting justices 
agree that Bruton does not apply to interlocking confessions. Justice 
Blackmun preferred to deal with Parker by finding that if Bruton error 
had occurred, it was harmless. 132 The main issue in Parker was the 
129. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2140. 
130. /d. n.7. 
131. /d. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2140. 
132. /d. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2143. 
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identification of the defendants at the scene of the crime. Because each 
of their own confessions placed them at the scene of the crime, and 
because one participant placed at least one of the defendants there, Jus-
tice Blackmun had little difficulty finding that the co-defendants' con-
fessions did not contribute to the conviction. 133 
As Judge Edwards had argued persuasively in the court of appeals 
below, the co-defendant confessions were important to the prosecu-
tion's case because the three defendants did not take part in the act of 
killing the victim. 134 In fact, one could also argue that the lower court's 
conclusion of prejudicial error should have received far more defer-
ence.135 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun's harmless error conclusion is 
a reasonable one under the facts in Parker, because "[e]ach confession 
largely overlapped with and was cumulative to the others." 136 
In terms of the major Confrontation Clause issue present in 
Parker, however, Justice Blackmun's discussion of the plurality's view 
of Bruton is far more important. Justice Blackmun expressly rejected 
the plurality's per se rule that Bruton does not apply to interlocking 
confessions: 
I would not adopt a rigid per se rule that forecloses a court from 
weighing all the circumstances in order to determine whether the 
defendant in fact was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of even 
an interlocking confession. Where he was unfairly prejudiced, the 
mere fact that prejudice was caused by an interlocking confession 
ought not to override the important interests that the Confronta-
tion Clause protects. 137 
Moreover, he was concerned that in many cases the confessions may 
not totally interlock: 
The two confessions may interlock in part only. Or they may 
cover only a portion of the events in issue at the trial. Although 
two interlockmg confessions may not be internally inconsistent, 
one may go far beyond the other in implicating the confessor's co-
defendant. In such circumstances, the admission of the confession 
of the codefendant who does not take the stand could very well 
serve to prejudice the defendant who is incriminated by the con-
fession, notwithstandiny that the defendant's own confession is, to 
an extent, interlocking. 38 
As Justice Blackmun saw the situation, the courts should first de-
termine whether the confessions truly interlock. In his view, if the 
133. /d. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2143. 
134. See discussion at- U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2143 n.l. 
135. Justice Stevens adheres to this position: "In my view, but not in his [Justice Black.mun), 
the concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the error here was not 
harmless preclude this Court from reaching a different result of this kind of issue." -U.S. at-, 
99 S. Ct. at 2143 (~tevens, J ., dissenting). 
136. /d. (Black.mun, J., concurring). 
137. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2142. 
138. /d. 
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statements do overlap, the question then becomes whether or not the 
defendant was "unfairly prejudiced" 139 by the use at trial of a non-
testifying co-defendant's confession. Unlike the plurality, he could not 
adopt a rigid rule to wholly avoid the sixth amendment inquiry. 
Justice Stevens began his dissent by focusing closely on the Court's 
language in Bruton. He also explained the policy behind the Confron-
tation Clause as stated in both Bruton and Pointer. 14° For Justice Ste-
vens the resolution of the problem of the interlocking confessions was a 
straightforward one: "Evidence that a defendant has made an 'extraju-
dicial admission of guilt' which 'stands before the jury unchallenged' is 
not an acceptable reason for depriving him of his constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against him." 141 While his own opinion tracked 
the Bruton rationale to reach this conclusion, Justice Stevens also ana-
lyzed the plurality's opinion and found that Justice Rehnquist's con-
trary conclusion on interlocking confessions rested on two erroneous 
assumptions. The first was that "the jury's ability to disregard the co-
defendant's inadmissible and highly prejudicial confession is invariably 
increased by the existence of a corroborating statement by the defend-
ant."142 Justice Stevens's disagreement was justified because this as-
sumption has no basis in fact or in .law, at least none to which the 
plurality can or does point. 143 It takes little imagination to suppose that 
when given two confessions the jurors will compare them and use both 
of them against the defendant. 
The second assumption that Justice Stevens found underlying the 
plurality opinion is that "all unchallenged confessions by a defendant 
are equally reliable." 144 This assumption has never been widely ac-
cepted in our criminal justice system. Although the judge determines 
the voluntariness of a confession under the Jackson rule, 145 juries are 
still specifically instructed to consider the circumstances surrounding 
the declarant's admission. 146 Thus, while juries cannot reverse the 
139. /d. 
140. In addition, he relied expressly on Justice Stewart's strong concurring opinion in Bruton; 
this point is interesting considering that Stewart joined the plurality in Parker. See text accompa-
nying notes 39-40 supra. 
141. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2145 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
142. /d. 
143. See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra. 
144. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2145 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. 
146. See, e.g., District of Columbia Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 38, at§ 2.46: 
Evidence has been introduced that the defendant [confessed that he committed) [made 
an admission concerning) the crime charged. You should weigh such evidence with caution 
and should carefully scrutinize all the circumstances surrounding the [alleged] [confession] 
[admission) in deciding [whether the defendant made it and] what weight to give it, along 
with all the other evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
In examining the circumstances of the [alleged] [confession] [admission) you may con-
sider whether it was made by the defendant freely and voluntarily with an understanding of 
the nature of his [confession] [admission], without fear, threats, coercion, or force, either 
physical or psychological, and without promise of reward. You may consider the conversa-
tions, if any, between the police and the defendant, including whether the defendant was 
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judge's determination of voluntariness, they must consider the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the confession to decide how much 
weight the statement deserves. The reason for this instruction is un-
doubtedly that some confessions are reliable, while others are not. 
A careful reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion reveals that his 
conclusion of no constitutional error is predicated on the assumption 
that the interlocking confession simply cannot present a serious practi-
cal problem for the defendant at trial. Otherwise, Justice Rehnquist 
could not rely so heavily on his confidence in the jury's ability to follow 
instructions and yet not feel compelled to overrule Bruton. Justice Ste-
vens set out a lengthy hypothetical example which reveals the flaw in 
Justice Rehnquist's assumption that the effect of the co-defendant's 
confession will necessarily be minimal. 147 The crucial aspect of the hy-
pothetical is that the defendant's own statement, while somewhat in-
criminating, was ambiguous or silent on some major points and not 
very prejudicial. Nevertheless, it was voluntarily given; thus, a jury 
could use the statement as evidence against him. The co-defendant's 
statement, however, was a lengthy and detailed confession clearly im-
plicating both himself and the defendant. Under these circumstances, 
it is difficult to avoid Justice Stevens's conclusion that the effect of the 
co-defendant's confession would be "devastating" and that the 
prejudice to the defendant's case would not "be entirely cured by the 
subsequent use of evidence of his own ambiguous statement." 148 
Justice Stevens quite properly concluded his opinion by returning 
to the one issue which is central to the sixth amendment analysis: 
"[T]he controlling question must be whether it is realistic to assume 
that the jury followed the judge's instructions to disregard those confes-
sions when it was evaluating petitioner's guilt." 149 In 1968 a majority 
of the Court said that it could not assume that jurors followed the 
judge's instructions to limit the use of confessions by co-defendants. 
No evidence was put forth then, or eleven years later, to counter what 
most practicing lawyers know: that jurors often rely on confessions be-
warned of his rights; the time and place that the [alleged] [confession] [admission] occurred; 
the length of time, if any, that the defendant was questioned; who was present; the physical 
and mental condition of the defendant; and all other circumstances surrounding the making 
of the [alleged] [confession] [admission], including the age, disposition, education, experience, 
character and intelligence of the defendant. In short, you should give the defendant's [al-
leged] [confession] [admission) such weight as you feel it deserves under all the circumstances. 
147. Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant X and 
codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is the tape of a televised inter-
view with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and executed the crime. Items two 
through nine involve circumstantial evidence of a past association between X and Y, a shared 
hostility for the victim, and an expressed wish for his early demise-evidence that in itself might 
very well be insufficient to convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of a drinking partner, a former 
cellmate, or a divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he had been with Y at the 
approximate time of the killing. Neither X nor Y takes the stand. 
-U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2145 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
148. ld. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2145-46. 
149. /d. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2147. 
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cause they-perhaps unlike attorneys and judges-find them proba-
tive. 150 
V. WHAT THE LAW Is, WHAT IT SHOULD BE 
Even though the Supreme Court reviewed the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing in Parker to resolve the conflict among the lower courts regarding 
interlocking confessions, that conflict has not been settled. Four mem-
bers of the Court take the position that Bruton does not apply in this 
area. Four others think that it does. Until a fifth vote can be cast in an 
appropriate case we are left with an even split on this crucial point. 
Before the casting of that vote, however, the flaws in the Parker plural-
ity opinion should be exposed. Preliminarily, the plurality's resolution 
raised more questions than it answered. For example, what is an inter-
locking confession? Would a casual statement by the defendant be suf-
ficient if it mentioned a subject that was at the heart of the co-
defendant's lengthy and detailed confession? Obviously, Justice Ste-
vens was most concerned with this point, for that example is his hypo-
thetical.151 His fears are well founded if the plurality opinion truly 
means that "so long as all the defendants have made some type of con-
fession which is placed in evidence, Bruton is inapplicable without in-
quiry into whether the confessions actually interlock and the extent 
thereof." 152 
Other unanswered questions remain after Parker. For instance, 
how is the judge to decide if the two confessions interlock? While some 
courts examine the extent of overlap quite carefully, 153 others simply 
ask whether the two confessions are substantially the same154 or 
whether as "to motive, plot and execution of the crime they are essen-
tially the same." 155 The Parker plurality gives no guidance to a court 
seeking to apply the appropriate standard. Even though the respon-
ISO. In Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. S39, SS9-60 (1947), Mr. Justice Rutledge re-
marked: 
The grave danger in this case, if any, arose not from the trial court's rulings upon admissibil-
ity or from its instructions to the jury. As we have said, these were as adequate as might 
reasonably be required in a joint trial. The danger rested rather in the risk that the jury, in 
disregard of the court's direction, would transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the effect of 
the excluded admissions from the case as made against Goldsmith and Weiss across the bar-
rier of the exclusion to the other three defendants. 
That danger was real. It is one likely to arise in any conspiracy trial and more likely to 
occur as the number of persons charged tos;ether increases. Perhaps even at best the safe-
guards provided by clear rulings on admissibility, limitations of the bearing of evidence as 
against particular individuals, and adequate instructions, are insufficient to ward off the dan-
ger entirely. It is therefore extremely important that those safeguards be made as impregna-
ble as possible. 
IS I. See text accompanying notes 147-SO supra. 
JS2. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2143 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
JS3. Eg., United States v. Fleming, S94 F.2d S98 (7th Cir. 1979). 
1S4. United States ex rel Duff v. Zelker, 4S2 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 406 U.S. 
932 (1972). 
ISS. United States ex rel Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 107S 
(1973). 
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dents in Parker argued that the confessions did not interlock, the plu-
rality opinion simply assumed the interlock. 156 
It is unlikely that the Court will soon resolve these troublesome 
questions. Yet, the plurality's approach in Parker gives rise to a far 
more serious objection. The Parker plurality apparently ignored the 
Court's prior statements emphasizing the importance of Confrontation 
Clause protection. In Pointer v. Texas 151 the Court had unanimously 
held that the Confrontation Clause applies to the states and had recog-
nized the absolute necessity that a defendant have the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. Reflecting on the distance the Court has 
traveled from Bruton to Parker, the language of the Justices writing in 
Pointer is illuminating. For Justice Black there was little question that 
the Constitution required the application of the clause in the state judi-
cial systems: 
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of 
cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a crimi-
nal case to confront the witnesses against him. And probably no 
one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would 
deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and 
bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case .... [We] 
have constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-examination as 
a protection for defendants in criminal cases. . . . There are few 
subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have 
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief 
that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essen-
tial and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is 
this country's constitutional goal. 158 
Justice Harlan found that "a right of confrontation is 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.' " 159 Justice Goldberg also thought that 
the sixth amendment right was "a fundamental right." 16° Finally, it is 
instructive to consider Justice Stewart's view: 
The right of defense counsel in a criminal case to cross-examine 
the prosecutor's living witnesses is "[o)ne of the fundamental guar-
antees of life and liberty" and "one of the safeguards essential to a 
fair trial." It is, I think, as indispensable an ingredient as the 
"right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge." 161 
These references are not put forth simply as an exercise to show 
156. -U.S. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2142 (Biackmun, J., concurring). The respondents' argument is 
set out in their brief before the Court. Brief for respondent at 10, Parker v. Randolph,- U.S.-, 
99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). 
157 .. 380 u.s. 400 (1965). 
158. /d. at 404-05. 
159. /d. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring), citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
160. /d. at 410 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
161. I d. (Stewart, J ., concurring). The difference in language among the Justices reflects the 
philosophical difference between members of the Court regarding the incorporation doctrine. See 
the concurring opinions of Justices Harlan, id. at 408, and Goldberg, id. at 410. 
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how the sixth amendment was incorporated to apply to the states. 
Rather, they point very clearly to the close connection between Pointer 
and Bruton. The Parker plurality appears to have forgotten that the 
sixth amendment violation in Bruton resulted from the trial court's ad-
mission of a co-defendant confession implicating the defendant, 
notwithstanding the court's use of clear limiting instruction. In that 
respect, the Bruton majority's language is particularly relevant: 
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, 
or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of 
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limi-
tations of the jury system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is 
presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial 
statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with 
the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint 
trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant 
but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when 
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh 
their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift 
blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolera-
bly compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not 
testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against 
such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was di-
rected.162 
Most striking about the plurality opinion in Parker is that the 
Court ignored the close connection between Pointer and Bruton. The 
fact is that the co-defendant's statements in Parker were admitted 
against the defendant in precisely the same way as they had been in 
Bruton. The only difference in Parker was that the defendant himself 
had made an incriminating statement. The admission of the co-de-
fendant's confession in this situation cannot be justified on the ground 
that it is necessarily more reliable than the defendant's statements; cer-
tainly, in many situations, it will be less reliable. Of even greater con-
cern, however, is the plurality's conclusion that Justice Jackson was 
wrong in his classic condemnation of limiting instructions: "The naive 
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to 
the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." 163 
The Parker plurality found the Bruton principle inapplicable to 
interlocking confessions because the defendant himself had made an 
inculpatory statement. The fact that the defendant has also confessed 
is no reason to disregard his sixth amendment rights. Fortunately, we 
have only a four to four vote at this time. Hopefully, the fifth and 
majority vote will carefully apply the Confrontation Clause to finder-
ror whenever a non-testifying co-defendant's statement implicates a de-
fendant. 
162. 391 U.S. at 135-36. 
163. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
